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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
contract,I especially when tainted with bribery.2  Following the
maxim of "whoever asks equity must do equity,' 3 it is required that
the other party must be put in status quo 4 and the accrued benefits
must be returned.8 But where restitution is made impossible by the
"duplicity of the wrongdoer" 6 the plaintiff is not deprived of his
remedy.7 However, the court, in shaping its decision may impose
suitable terms.8 The basic principle of equity is justice and equity
will adapt its decree to the facts under consideration. 9 In the instant
case, there was no question of the stock having passed to bona fide
purchasers, since the exchanged stock had been transferred only to
another corporation, whose officers were identical with those in the
guilty corporation. The contract was voidable in its inception, and
continued so, since there was no ratification.'0 In this instance, the
court illustrated again that where it once secures jurisdiction of a
case, it will apply its underlying equitable principles as liberally as
necessary.
F. H.
EVIDENCE-JUDICIAL NoTIcE.-Plaintiff was struck by an auto-
mobile, owned and operated by the defendant. At the trial, witnesses
'Cohen v. Ellis, 42 Hun 660, 4 N. Y. St. Rep. 721 (N. Y. 1886); Delano v.
Rice, 23 App. Div. 327, 48 N. Y. Supp. 295 (1st Dept. 1897); Chisholm v.
Eisenbuth, 69 App. Div. 134, 74 N. Y. Supp. 496 (1st Dept. 1902); see also
John v. Reynolds, 115 App. Div. 647, 10 N. Y. Supp. 293 (1st Dept. 1906)
(exchange of stock in a telephone and telegraph company for shares in another
telegraph company by false representation) ; Stern v. Stern, 122 App. Div. 821,
107 N. Y. Supp. 900 (1st Dept. 1907) (falsity concerning amount of produc-
tion, dividends, etc.).
'Donemar, Inc. v. Malloy, 252 N. Y. 360, 169 N. E. 610 (1930).
WALSH, EQUITY (1930) pp. 281 et seq.
'Gravenhorst v. Zimmerman, 236 N. Y. 22, 139 N. E. 766 (1923); Slater
v. Slater, 240 N. Y. 557, 148 N. E. 703 (1925) ; Mincho v. Bankers Life Ins.
Co. of City of New York, 124 App. Div. 578, 109 'N. Y. Supp. 179 (1st
Dept. 1908).
.McNamara v. Eastman Kodak Co., 232 N. Y. 18, 133 N. E. 113 (1921);
Wolf v. National City Bank, 170 App. Div. 565, 156 N. Y. Supp. 575 (1st
Dept. 1915) ; Sincerbeaux v. Queensboro Corp., 221 App. Div. 880, 224 N. Y.
Supp. 915 (2d Dept. 1927).
American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N. Y. 1, 10, 166 N. E. 783, 786
(1929).
"Thomas v. Beals, 154 Mass. 51, 27 N. E. 1004 (1891); Allerton v.
Allerton, 50 N. Y. 670 (1872); Continental Insurance Co. v. Equitable Trust
Co. of New York, 127 Misc. 45, 215 N. Y. Supp. 281 (Spec. T. 1926).
S Butler v. Prentiss, 158 N. Y. 49, 52 N. E. 652 (1899); Heskscher v.
Edenborn, 203 N. Y. 210, 96 N. E. 441 (1911); Buffalo Builders Supply Co.
v. Rieb, 247 N. Y. 170. 159 N. E. 899 (1928); United Zinc Companies v.
Harwood, 216 Mass. 474, 103 N. E. 1037 (1914) (decided squarely on the
Buffalo case).
9 Philips v. West Rockaway Land Co., 226 N. Y. 507, 124 N. E. 87 (1919);
Badger v. Scobell Chemical Co., 247 N. Y. 587, 161 N. E. 193 (1928).
"0 The very act of suing disaffirms any possibility of ratification.
RECENT DECISIONS
were permitted to testify that, at the time of the accident, plaintiff's
chestnut hair was just beginning to grey; and that within a day or
two after the accident her hair had turned snow-white. No medical
testimony was given to the effect that the accident was an adequate
procuring cause of the change. The defendant made a motion to
strike out this evidence. The motion was denied. Upon appeal,
held, that it was not error to permit the jury to consider, on the
question of damages, the fact that plaintiff's hair turned white, despite
the absence of evidence tending to show that the change in color was
directly due to the accident, and the shock occasioned thereby. Shaw
v. Tague, 257 N. Y. 193, 177 N. E. 417 (1931).
Judicial notice has been characterized by one author as the most
elastic doctrine in the realm of law. 1  It is patent that the list of
things of which courts will take judicial cognizance is being con-
stantly enlarged. 2 This principle which has been given formal defini-
tion by eminent courts 3 and text-writers 4 has been pithily sum-
marized in a vigorous statement by the Supreme Court of California :r
"Judicial notice is a judicial shortcut, a doing away, in
the case of evidence, because there is no real necessity for it.
So far as matters of common knowledge are concerned, it is
saying there is no need of formally offering evidence of those
things, because practically everyone knows them in advance,
and there can be no question about them."
When the discretion of the court should be exercised, is to be
determined by the following test: 6 (1) Is the fact one of common,
everyday knowledge, which every one of average intelligence within
the precincts of the court's jurisdiction can be presumed to know?
and (2) Is the thing in question really a fact, certain and indispu-
table? These criteria require interpretation. Although it is true that
"a fact must be pretty well known and pretty obvious besides, before
'RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1931) §51.
2State v. Mission Pacific Ry. Co., 212 Mo. 658, 111 S. W. 500 (1908).
'U. S. v. Hammers, 241 Fed. 542 (S. D. Fla. 1917), quoting the U. S.
Supreme Court: "Judicial notice or knowledge may be defined as the cog-
nizance of certain facts which judge and jurors may, under the rules of legal
procedure or otherwise, properly take and act upon without proof because they
already know them."
People v. Goldberger, 163 N. Y. Supp. 663, 666 (1916). The Court of
Special Sessions defined judicial notice as "a mode of ascertainment by judicial
authority of matters of universal knowledge without having such matters
established by evidence in the individual case."
'McKELEY, EVIDENCE (1924) §12. "The doctrine of judicial notice is
that there are certain facts of which the courts will not require evidence,
because they are so well known, so easily ascertainable or so related to the
official character of the court, that it would not be good sense to do so."
'Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Calif. 338, 181 Pac. 223 (1919).
0 Ibid.
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it can be taken judicial notice of," 7 it is not requisite that everyone
know it; 8 if by far the greater part of the intelligent community have
such knowledge, it will suffice.9 Truth alone will not support a taking
of judicial notice; 10 general notoriety must exist.:" So, the courts
will not take notice of the cause of tumors on the human body, 2 nor
of the fact that a blow might cause congestion of the lung,13 but will
take notice of the fact that vaccination prevents smallpox. 4 In gen-
eral, caution is advised; and .any doubt attendant upon the granting
of judicial recognition should be promptly resolved in the negative. 1
Applying these principles to the instant case, two queries must be
propounded. Initial consideration must be given to the proposition
of whether or not the great mass of people believe sudden fright may
cause one's hair to turn white. The court decides this in the affirma-
tive, and states its agreement simply with a reference to Byron's
"The Prisoner of Chillon." 16 As to whether science authenticates
the popular conception-here the court stands on more solid ground.
A review of medical authorities is controlling.17  The reviewer can
See International Harvester Co. v. Ind. Comm., 157 Wis. 167, 147 N. W.
53, 58 (1914).
' Matter of Viemeister v. White, 179 N. Y. 235, 72 N. E. 97 (1904).
1 Topeka v. Stevenson, 79 Kan. 394, 99 Pac. 589 (1909); Moler v. Whis-
man, 243 Mo. 571, 147 S. W. 985 (1912).
"Baxter v. McDonnell, 155 N. Y. 83, 49 N. E. 667 (1898).
Doyle v. City of New York, 58 App. Div. 588, 69 N. Y. Supp. 120
(2d Dept. 1901).
' Poumeroulie v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co., 178 Mo. App. 357, 165
S. W. 1174 (1920).
SKoprivica v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 218 S. W. 689 (1920).
1 Matter of Viemeister v. White, supra note 8.
' See Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37, 42, 43 (1875).
16 "My hair is grey, but not with years;
Nor grew it white,
In a single night,
As men's have grown from sudden fears."
(In the annotated edition, reputed to have happened to Ludovico Sforza and
Marie Antoinette.)
' The court quotes MULLER, HAIR AND ITS PRESESVATION: "Gray hair, so
long regarded purely as a sign of approaching or premature age, is simply due
to loss of pigment, or the presence of more or less air, within the hair, caused
either by sickness, worry, shock, severe mental strain long continued, or
accidents."
The supporting statement from that source is generally substantiated in
the following:
STELWAGON, DISEASES OF THE SKIN (1923) 1031. "There are now to be
found in medical literature a number of examples in which the change to gray-
ness was noted to occur within the space of a few hours or days."
1 LAYcocK, BRITISH AND FOREIGN MEDICAL-CHIRURGICAL REvIEW (1861)
p. 458. Case recorded of a Sepoy whose hair turned gray in one-half hour.
2 RAYMOND, REvuE DE MEDECINE (1882) p. 770. Case of a woman's hair
changing color in one night as a result of financial disaster.
RECENT DECISIONS
but agree with this decision which proceeds along well-established
legal principles.' s Private dissent, if any, must be made on the
grounds of disagreement with the opinion of the court that the fact
in question is a notion commonly had.
H.H.
INSURANCE (LIFE)-PARTICIPATION IN "AERONAUTIC EXPE-
DITION."--Plaintiff's son in 1924 entered into a contract with the
defendant for life insurance which provided for double indemnity in
case of death by accident, unless it should be caused directly or
indirectly by " * " * military or naval service of any kind in time of
war or by engaging as a passenger or otherwise in submarine or
aeronautic expeditions." While insured was traveling as a passenger
from Albany to New York in an airplane operated by a large air
transport company which maintained a regular passenger service, the
machine fell and he sustained mortal injuries. Defendant appealed
from a judgment granting double indemnity to the plaintiff, who was
named beneficiary in the policy. Held, insured met his death while
engaged in an "aeronautic expedition," hence within the exception of
the policy and the plaintiff was not entitled to double indemnity.
Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 256
N. Y. 208, 176 N. E. 144 (1931).
It is a generally accepted principle that contracts of insurance
will be given a construction which makes the contract fair and reason-
able and that if any ambiguity exists, the interpretation will be in
favor of the insured.' The advent of the newer modes of transpor-
tation in the air and under water and its recognized dangers has
thrust upon the courts the duty of interpreting various clauses in
insurance policies limiting liability where death or injury has resulted
from such transportation. It has been held that a person riding in an
airplane as a passenger on short trips has "participated in aeronau-
"Kieran v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 13 Misc. Rep. 39, 34 N. Y. Supp.
95 (1895); Langdon v. Waldo, 158 App. Div. 936, 143 N. Y. Supp. 818 (2d
Dept. 1913); Cavalier v. Chevrolet Motor Co. of N. Y., 189 App. Div. 412,
178 N. Y. Supp. 489 (3d Dept. 1919); Richardson v. Greenburg, 188 App. Div.
248, 176 N. Y. Supp. 651 (3d Dept. 1919); Wager v. White Star Candy Co.,
217 App. Div. 316, 217 N. Y. Supp. 173 (3d Dept. 1926) ; Gilbert v. Klar, 223
App. Div. 200, 228 N. Y. Supp. 183 (4th Dept. 1928) ; Sloane v. So. Calif. Ry.
Co., 111 Calif. 668, 44 Pac. 320, 322 (1896). "It is matter of general knowledge
that an attack of sudden fright, or an exposure to imminent peril, has produced
in individuals a complete change in their nervous systen, and rendered one who
was physically strong and vigorous, weak and timid." This statement, it will
be seen, is a near approximation of the instant decision.
1 Bushey & Son v. Amer. Ins. Co., 237 N. Y. 24, 142 N. E. 340 (1923).
